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JUDICIAL DOCTRINE AS RISK REGULATION
BRANNON P. DENNING* & MICHAEL B. KENT, JR.**
Much of the literature on risk regulation concerns "first-order"
risks--e.g., those addressed by environmental law or workplace safety
rules. But scholars recently have suggested that risk regulation can
provide a helpful framework for thinking about "second-order," or
political, risks arising from allocations of power and institutional
design. Although a few commentators have utilized this perspective to
suggest connections between risk regulation and particular areas of
constitutional law, in this essay we take a broader view. Building on
the existing literature, we argue that the selection of constitutional
decision rules is a judicial effort to regulate the political risk that
government officials will violate constitutional principles.
After making the case that it is helpful to view judicial doctrinal
formation as a species of political risk regulation, we discuss some
implications of this risk regulation model and pose some questions
for future research. We conclude that the risk regulation model
reinforces the notion that the formation of doctrine is a temporally
extended process, rather than a one-time event, and it provides a
metric by which that doctrine can be evaluated. Additionally, the risk
regulation model helps explain some of the more commonly critiqued
features of constitutional law. Finally, the risk regulation model
raises important questions that merit further investigation: (1)
Should we trust judicial perceptions of and responses to political
risk? (2) What influences risk assessment among judges, and are
those influences (and resulting assessments) normatively defensible?
(3) What connection, if any, exists between judicial risk assessment
and the myriad doctrinal formulae employed by the Supreme Court?
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1. INTRODUCTION
As a number of scholars have pointed out, determining what the
Constitution permits or prohibits through interpretation is
ordinarily only the first step employed by the United States
Supreme Court when it decides cases. This first step-where the
Court derives from the Constitution what Mitchell Berman has
termed "constitutional operative propositions"-is then followed by a
second step where the Court implements those propositions through
the development of "constitutional decision rules."' As Kermit
Roosevelt notes, decision rules are what "the Supreme Court creates
to take it from the grand language of the Constitution to the actual
outcomes of particular cases." 2 These decision rules, which make up
the warp and woof of ordinary constitutional law, are familiar to
students. 3 They are the multi-part tests and standards of review
that Robert Nagel criticized as part and parcel of the "formulaic
Constitution."4
1. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 9
(2004); see also Mitchell N. Berman, Aspirational Rights and the Two-Output Thesis,
119 HARV. L. REV. F. 220, 221 (2006).
2. KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: MAKING SENSE
OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 19 (2006).
3. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 7-101
(2001). (cataloguing and analyzing the Court's use of seven types of doctrinal tests);
see also LACKLAND H. BLOOM, JR., METHODS OF INTERPRETATION 205, 257-350
(2009) (defining doctrine as "the rules that are developed from prior cases, which at
some point seem to assume a life quite independent of the cases from which the|]
rules arose and which are applied in subsequent cases with no consideration of the
factual contexts out of which they initially arose," and discussing how doctrine is
formed and changed by the Court).
4. See ROOSEVELT, supra note 2, at 19:
Read some Supreme Court opinions . . . . You will encounter tiers of
scrutiny, five-factor tests, requirements of congruence and proportionality,
[Vol. 82:405406
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Richard Fallon has classified these decision rules;5 other scholars
have analyzed and critiqued decision rules developed in particular
areas of constitutional law.6 Decision rules take many forms-rules,
standards, suspect-content rules, balancing tests, and tiered scrutiny
are merely a few of their more familiar iterations. Importantly,
decision rules occupy various points along a spectrum running from
near-total deference (consider the "classic" rational basis of economic
substantive due process7) to a near-conclusive presumption of
unconstitutionality (judicial review of prior restraints8 and penalties
for religious belief or nonbelief9 are two examples).
In an earlier article, we contributed to this literature by
describing anti-evasion doctrines ("AEDs").10 AEDs are decision
rules that the Court creates and applies to fill gaps left by earlier
decision rules, specifically gaps that allow form-over-substance
evasion of those rules." In a second article, we discussed the Court's
refusal to create AEDs and speculated about what motivates the
Court to create them in some cases and not in others.12 That the
Court is regularly called on to reassess the sufficiency of earlier
and undue burden analysis. You will find a host of bewildering distinctions,
between content-based and content-neutral regulations of speech, between
hard and soft money, between intentional discrimination and disparate
impact. All these and more await new law students and citizens bold
enough to venture into the work product of their nation's highest court.
See generally Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165
(1985).
5. FALLON, supra note 3, at 7-101.
6. For other contributions to this literature, see Brannon P. Denning &
Michael B. Kent, Jr., Anti-Evasion Doctrines in Constitutional Law, 2012 UTAH L.
REV. 1773, 1775 n.6 [hereinafter Denning & Kent, Anti-Evasion Doctrines].
7. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) ("The day
is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because
they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought.").
8. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) ("Any system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its
constitutional validity.").
9. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) ("[N]either a State nor the
Federal Government can constitutionally force a person 'to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion."').
10. Denning & Kent, Anti-Evasion Doctrines, supra note 6, at 1779.
11. Id.
12. Brannon P. Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Anti-Anti-Evasion in
Constitutional Law, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 397 (2014) [hereinafter Denning & Kent,
Anti-Anti-Evasion].
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decision rules, and sometimes supplements them in light of new
threats to the principles they were supposed to implement, suggests
that the creation and application of decision rules is a process rather
than a one-time event.13
This process by which judges create doctrine, moreover, seems to
us a species of risk regulation.'4 Risk regulation is the subject of an
enormous literature.' 5 Much of that literature addresses risks to life
and health posed by new or existing technologies and the efforts of
government to ameliorate or mitigate those risks through regulation.
But in addition to these "first-order risks"-i.e., those that arise from
"unintended consequences of human action" or "the intended result
of human action" or "the interaction between human action and the
forces of nature" and that are addressed by environmental law,
workplace safety rules, and the like-scholars recently have
suggested that risk regulation can provide a helpful framework for
thinking about "second-order" or "political" risks-i.e., those "that
arise from the design of institutions, from the allocation of power
across institutions, and from the selection of officials to staff
institutions."1 6 This framework posits that "constitutions and public
law generally are best understood as devices for regulating and
managing political risks."17 As Adrian Vermeule put it recently:
"[P]olitical risk regulation asks how institutions should be designed,
how competences should be allocated, and how officials should be
selected to produce the best attainable constitutional system."1
8 A
few commentators have utilized this perspective to suggest
connections between risk regulation and particular areas of
constitutional law,1 9 but we are not aware of any work that has
13. Denning & Kent, Anti-Evasion Doctrines, supra note 6, at 1814.
14. Id.
15. For a sampling, see infra Part II.A and sources cited therein.
16. ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE CONSTITUTION OF RISK 3-4 (2014).
17. Id. at 2.
18. Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Political Risk and Public Law, 4 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 1 (2012) [hereinafter Vermeule, Political Risk].
19. See, e.g., VERMEULE, supra note 16, at 29-45 (describing constitutional
principles and interpretive techniques that exhibit features of the precautionary
principle used to address health and safety risks); Jonathan Remy Nash, The
Supreme Court and the Regulation of Risk in Criminal Law Enforcement, 92 B.U. L.
REV. 171, 224 (2012) (criticizing "attempts by the Supreme Court to import
paradigmatic risk analysis into the criminal law"); Mark Tushnet, The First
Amendment and Political Risk, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 103, 105-06 (2012) (critiquing
particular First Amendment decisions "by describing several cases in which the
courts' assessment of the risk that speech causes harm seems mistaken, either
because the courts seem to be mistaken in thinking that the legislature's estimates of
the risk of harm are excessive . . . or because the courts are insensitive to questions
[Vol. 82:405408
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looked at judicial doctrine-creation generally through the lens of risk
regulation. We do so here.
In this essay, we argue that the selection of decision rules-
either initially or subsequently (as in the case of AEDs)-should be
understood as judicial efforts to regulate public risk, the public risk
being violation of constitutional principles by government officials.
The selection of decision rules strikes us as precisely the kind of
second-order, retail-level political risk regulation that Vermeule
describes. Constitutional principles often come framed at a relatively
high level of generality-so high, in fact, that direct enforcement is
usually difficult, if not impossible. 20 The decision rules occupy the
role of intermediating regulations that get applied to particular
situations to resolve actual cases.21 The analogy here is to
administrative agency personnel charged with designing regulations
that address risks according to guidelines furnished in legislation-
usually at a comparably high level of generality. Unlike
administrative regulations however, the decision rules developed
and applied by the Court are not subject to executive branch or
about the distribution of harm.") (footnotes omitted). Though he did not use the
vocabulary of risk regulation, Vincent Blasi's article The Pathological Perspective
and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1985), makes a normative case
that the Court ought to adopt something like the precautionary principle when it
comes to the First Amendment. The Court's "overriding objective" in interpreting the
First Amendment, he wrote,
should be to equip the first amendment to do maximum service in those
historical periods when intolerance of unorthodox ideas is most prevalent
and when governments are most able and most likely to stifle dissent
systematically. The first amendment, in other words, should be targeted for
the worst of times.
Id. at 449-50. Blasi then immediately suggested that other rules might obtain for
different provisions of the Constitution. Id. at 450 ("Certain clauses-the equal
protection and cruel and unusual punishment clauses, for example-may be
designed, or at least most wisely interpreted, to serve the society primarily in periods
of unusual idealism or cohesion.").
20. ROOSEVELT, supra note 2, at 18-19 (arguing that "the plain meaning [of the
Constitution] does not get us all the way to a decision. The idealized opposite of
judicial activism-what I call 'direct enforcement' of the Constitution-turns out to
be a fantasy.').
21. CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS: THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
SUPREME COURT 3 (2004) ("Unmediated, fresh reference in contemporary disputes to
the spare and distant text of the Constitution cannot possibly offer the regularity
and rationality which is the indispensable characteristic of a government of law. The
Constitution's text must be mediated by doctrine before it can yield decision.").
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congressional oversight and correction if the regulators
misapprehend the risk by over- or under-regulating it.22
Our argument proceeds as follows. Part II discusses theoretical
models of risk regulation generally, describes recent scholarship
applying those models to the regulation of political risk specifically,
and situates doctrinal formation in the latter conversation. Part III
canvasses the implications of our theories for constitutional law
more broadly and suggests some questions for future research.
Conceiving the choice of constitutional doctrine as risk
regulation strengthens our belief that the formation of doctrine is a
temporally extended process. If doctrine is a manifestation of the
Justices' perceptions of political risk, then changing doctrine
suggests that those perceptions of risk change from time to time.
This fact, in turn, can explain several features of the Court's
constitutional jurisprudence. It explains why the Court's agenda has
changed over time-for example, shifting from the protection of
property rights to civil liberties in the 1940s or the revival in
judicially-enforced federalism during the Rehnquist Court. The risk
regulation model of doctrine can also explain doctrinal fluidity.
Changes in perceptions of risk can cause the Court to alter the level
of judicial scrutiny in particular areas, substituting a deferential
standard of review for a more searching one or vice versa. The
diversity of the Court's decision rules formulae-the different
standards of review, tiered scrutiny, per se rules of illegitimacy, and
the like-may all be put down to the Court's varied perceptions of
risk to particular constitutional principles. In addition, variances in
risk perception may explain intradoctrinal variety as well. The use
by the Court of rational basis with "bite," for example, may have
more to do with a perceived increase in risk to constitutional
principle than with willful mendacity on the Court's part.
If we are correct, a host of questions arise. How do Justices
assess these risks? Are their perceptions defensible, or are they
products of various cognitive biases that infect so much of human
thinking elsewhere? Are there dominant factors that play a role in
either risk perception or in the means chosen to meet the perceived
risk? Are there mechanisms available to the Justices to test their
assumptions, perhaps helping to de-bias their decisions? Are there
institutional reforms that could help? What about the Court's
specific responses to risk? Are those responses optimal ones, or do
22. VERMEULE, supra note 16, at 10-11 (presenting "precautionary
constitutionalism" and "optimizing constitutionalism" as opposing points on a risk-
regulation spectrum); see also Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status
of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (discussing the
underenforcement of constitutional principles by courts).
[Vol. 82:405410
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they instead unduly over- or under-enforce particular constitutional
principles? How, precisely, do particular decision rules function as
risk regulation? We raise these questions in Part III but do not
attempt to resolve all of them, leaving resolution of those questions
for future work.
II. DECISION RULE CHOICE AND JUDICIAL REGULATION OF
POLITICAL RISK
In this Part we make our case that judicial design of doctrine,
including both the initial choice and supplementing of decision rules
to implement constitutional principles, is a form of political risk
regulation undertaken by the Supreme Court. In doing so, we first
briefly describe some leading theories of first-order risk regulation,
including the precautionary principle, cost-benefit analysis, and
cultural risk cognition. We then look at the application of risk
regulation to second-order political risks. Just as constitutional
provisions and interpretive rules attempt to regulate risk at the
wholesale level by anticipating and preventing harms from becoming
manifest, we think that courts-the Supreme Court in particular-
employ retail level decision rules to guard against similar risks in a
way that is hinted at in the existing literature but not fully explored.
A. Regulation of First-Order Risks
As noted above, risk regulation is the subject of a vast literature
in a variety of fields, much of which concerns first-order risks
associated with environmental protection, food and drug regulation,
occupational safety, and related areas of public policy. 23 In
addressing these types of risks, regulators must focus on a number
of complex issues. A "somewhat stylized summary of how
environmental law responds to risk," for example, emphasizes the
following questions: "(1) Is there any risk? (2) Is the showing of risk
sufficient to justify governmental action? (3) What about the risk-
risk tradeoffs? 24 (4) Who is best positioned to answer these
questions?"25
23. VERMEULE, supra note 16, at 3.
24. The phrase "risk-risk tradeoffs" refers to the fact that regulation itself may
give rise to risks that minimize or undermine the purpose for which the regulation is
being proposed. See Nash, supra note 19, at 195-96 ("Risk-risk analysis calls upon
regulators to balance the risks that a proposed regulation will reduce against the
risks to which regulation itself may give rise."); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the
Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1024 (2003) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Precautionary Principle] (discussing the problem of "substitute risks, in the form of
2015] 411
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Although on the surface these inquiries appear to be fairly
straightforward, a foundational problem in regulating first-order
risks is how to respond to threats in the absence of complete
information. What if regulators are uncertain about the magnitude
of danger that might accompany a particular action or even whether
the danger really exists in the first place? To account for the varying
levels of knowledge that regulators possess when making decisions,
scholars have distinguished among conditions of risk, uncertainty,
and ignorance. Situations involving "risk," from a technical
standpoint, are those in which decision-makers know both the
possible outcomes that may result from an activity and the
probabilities associated with those outcomes. 26 In circumstances
involving "uncertainty," however, the decision-makers can determine
only the possible outcomes; the probabilities that those outcomes will
occur remain unquantifiable. 27 Finally, some situations call for
decisions to be made where neither the possible outcomes nor their
probabilities can be established, a condition known in the literature
as "ignorance." 28 All of these situations fall under the general
heading of risk.29
How best to deal with these various information gaps is a subject
of substantial importance in the literature on first-order risk
regulation. Especially significant is how to regulate in conditions of
uncertainty or ignorance. Many first-order risks-those associated
with environmental policy, for example-present "complex technical
and economic issues" about which "lawmakers rarely have anything
approaching perfect knowledge." 30 This dearth of information is
central to a debate between proponents of the two leading models for
hazards that materialize, or are increased, as a result of regulation").
25. Nash, supra note 19, at 192.
26. THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE 20TH CENTURY: LATE LESSONS
FROM EARLY WARNINGS 188 (Poul Harremoes et al., eds., 2002); see also Aaron
Wildavsky, The Political Economy of Efficiency: Cost-Benefit Analysis, Systems
Analysis, and Program Budgeting, 26 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 292, 296 (1966) (defining
"risk" as situation "where the precise outcome cannot be predicted but a probability
distribution can be specified").
27. THE PRECUATIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE 20TH CENTURY, supra note 26, at
188.
28. Id.
29. See VERMEULE, supra note 16, at 6 ("The term has a colloquial sense that
includes . . . well-defined decision-theoretic concepts such as risk, uncertainty, and
ignorance.").
30. JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY 14 (3d ed. 2010).
[Vol. 82:405412
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assessing and managing risk-the precautionary principle and cost-
benefit analysis.3 '
"[F]ast becoming a staple of regulatory policy," 32 the
precautionary principle has been prominent in the field of
international environmental law 3 3 and is reflected in various strands
of American law, as well.34 Attempts to discuss the principle are
made difficult, however, by the absence of agreement on what it
actually means or demands.35 Indeed, one account has identified
nineteen different versions of the principle. 36 It is useful, therefore,
to think of a continuum of various precautionary principles, ranging
from weak to strong iterations.3 7 Weak versions of the principle
typically hold that an activity can be regulated despite a lack of
conclusive evidence regarding the nature or extent of the risk posed
by that activity.3 8 Stronger versions suggest an anticipatory
approach to risk management, favoring regulation in the face of
uncertainty and shifting the burden of proof to the proponent of the
putatively harmful activity to show that it should not be regulated.39
Especially in its strong forms, the precautionary principle is marked
by its prophylactic tendencies: "The Principle encourages conducting
... risk assessment, where possible, on an ex ante, premarket basis,
rather than in a reactive posture in response to harm that has
already occurred."40
Often juxtaposed against the precautionary principle is some
form of cost-benefit analysis. Here, too, discussions "are hampered
by lack of consistency in the use of terms."4 1 As explained by
31. See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel & James Thuo Gathii, Cost-Benefit Analysis
Versus The Precautionary Principle: Beyond Cass Sunstein's Laws of Fear, 2006 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1037, 1038 (reviewing CASS SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005)) (describing cost-benefit analysis and
precautionary principle as "paramount" paradigms for risk regulation).
32. Sunstein, Precautionary Principle, supra note 24, at 1005.
33. SALzMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 30, at 17.
34. See, e.g., Noah M. Sachs, Rescuing the Strong Precautionary Principle From
Its Critics, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1285, 1307-10 (noting examples).
35. Id. at 1292 ("Precaution in risk regulation is controversial, in part, because
of a lack of consensus on what precaution means."); Sunstein, Precautionary
Principle, supra note 24, at 1011 ("There are numerous definitions [of the
precautionary principle], and they are not compatible with one another.").
36. See Sachs, supra note 34, at 1292 n.28 (citing Per Sandin, Dimensions of the
Precautionary Principle, 5 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 899 (1999)).
37. Sunstein, Precautionary Principle, supra note 24, at 1011-12.
38. Id. at 1012; see also Sachs, supra note 34, at 1292.
39. Sachs, supra note 34, at 1288 & n.12.
40. Id. at 1298.
41. Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109
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Professor Vermeule: "'Cost-benefit analysis' is a protean term that
can be used to encompass everything from informal
consequentialism-Charles Darwin's list of the pros and cons of
marriage-to a formal, fully monetized analysis of compensating
variations based on willingness to pay and accept." 4 2 Used in its less
formal sense, cost-benefit analysis serves primarily as "an invitation
to identify the advantages and disadvantages of regulation,"43 often
by widening the focus so that all relevant risks and alternatives-
including those resulting from regulatory action itself-are placed in
consideration. 44
In addition to the precautionary principle and cost-benefit
analysis, a third (and growing) school of thought emphasizes the role
of cultural cognition in assessing and managing first-order risks.
Scholars who advance this theory use the phrase "cultural cognition"
to "refer to the psychological disposition of persons to conform their
factual beliefs about the instrumental efficacy (or perversity) of law
to their cultural evaluations of the activities subject to regulation." 45
Put differently, people perceive certain activities as risky or not-
and correspondingly view public policies designed to deal with those
risks as beneficial or not-based largely on their preexisting cultural
commitments and worldviews. 46 If correct, this theory posits that
there is more to conflicts over risk regulation than gaps in the
available information. As an initial matter, the argument goes, even
where individuals are presented with sound information, they
nonetheless evaluate that information in ways that reinforce their
own cultural predispositions. 47 Secondly, and perhaps more
importantly, individuals tend to obtain information from sources
YALE L.J. 165, 176 (1999); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1060 (2000) [hereinafter Sunstein, Cognition]
("[M]uch of the controversy over cost-benefit analysis stems from the difficulty of
specifying, with particularity, what that form of analysis entails.").
42. VERMEULE, supra note 16, at 79 (footnotes omitted).
43. Sunstein, Cognition, supra note 41, at 1089.
44. See Sunstein, Precautionary Principle,, supra note 24, at 1056-57
(advocating an approach that "would acknowledge that a wide variety of adverse
effects may come from inaction, regulation, and everything in between"); see also
Sachs, supra note 34, at 1306-07 (discussing cost-benefit approaches described by
certain scholars as enabling regulators "to assess and compare the risks that would
be created by different decision-making paths").
45. Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 149, 151-52 (2006).
46. See id. at 154 ("[Ilndividuals select certain risks for attention and disregard
others in a way that reflects and reinforces the particular worldviews to which they
adhere.").
47. Id. at 151.
414 [Vol. 82:405'
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE AS RISK REGULATION
they trust, meaning that they rely on experts who share their
worldviews and whose analyses often suffer from the same cultural
biases.48
B. Political Risk Regulation
Although the foregoing theories were developed to manage
environmental and technological threats to life and health, risk
regulation analysis need not be confined to such first-order risks.
Rather, as Professor Vermeule recently pointed out, these theories
may also be applied productively to "second-order risks [arising] from
the design of institutions, from the allocation of power across
institutions to make first-order decisions, and from the selection of
officials to staff institutions."49 This section examines how Vermeule
cashes out that observation by describing precautionary principles
that occur both at the wholesale level of constitutional design and
general interpretive principles, as well as at the retail interpretive
level.50 Additionally, Vermeule describes (and supports) the "mature
position" of second-order risk regulation, which is "structurally
parallel" to the informal cost-benefit approaches contrasted against
the precautionary principle in the first-order context.5 '
Vermeule begins his discussion by cataloguing examples in
which versions of the precautionary principle recur in both
constitutional history and constitutional law. The Anti-federalists,
for example, feared that every delegation of power to government
carried with it the seeds of tyranny and so based their opposition to
a novel scheme of governance like the Constitution on the risk that
such tyranny would come to pass. 52 In this way, they "offered a
precautionary master principle of constitutional design," dismissing
niceties over the probability that such harm would occur and,
instead, "aiming to preclude even the possibility that constitutional
power would be abused."53 From such wholesale precautionary
48. Id. at 155-56; see also Dan M. Kahan, et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural
Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1094 (2006) (reviewing
CASS SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005))
("Like members of the general public, experts are inclined to form attitudes toward
risk that best express their cultural vision.").
49. VERMEULE, supra note 16, at 3-4.
50. Id. at 29-45.
51. Id. at 77.
52. Id. at 30.
53. Id.; see also id. (discussing Hume's "knavery principle"-the idea that
government should be designed upon the presumption that all men are knaves, thus
incorporating checks and balances to restrain their baser motivations).
2015] 415
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notions, Vermeule then moves to a number of "retail principles of
constitutional design" that likewise embodied some version of the
precautionary principle. 54 The unitary executive,55 separation of
powers, 56 limits on the creation and maintenance of standing
armies,57 and arguments favoring a bill of rights58 were defended
and criticized on "explicitly precautionary grounds."59
Rules of interpretation too, often reflect precautionary concerns
at both wholesale and retail levels. Interpretive canons "urging that
the constitution be 'strictly' or 'narrowly' construed to prevent
political risks" are one example of wholesale precaution.60 Vermeule
shows that these canons have been employed both with regard to
federalism principles and in cases involving individual rights.61
Another example is provided by arguments favoring judicial review,
which is said to offer valuable precautions "against an uncertain
propensity to rights-violations by legislative and executive actors" by
"add[ing] another veto-point to the lawmaking system."62
Of particular interest is Vermuele's discussion of retail-level
interpretive principles. Though he does not frame his discussion, as
we do here, in terms of doctrinal formation generally, he does
observe that particular cases announce decision rules that
incorporate precautionary principles. He cites, as one example, Chief
Justice Marshall's bright-line rule prohibiting state taxation of
federal instrumentalities in McCulloch v.. Maryland.63 "Marshall
argued that an expansive construction of state taxing power"
endangered the existence of federal instrumentalities "because 'the
power to tax involves the power to destroy."' 64 Precautionary
arguments are particularly common, he argues, in First Amendment
jurisprudence, citing as an example Vincent Blasi's "pathological"
approach to the First Amendment that "urges judges to devise free
speech doctrine by taking a 'pathological perspective', in which
constitutional rules are geared to preventing the worst-case
54. Id.
55. Id. at 31.
56. Id. at 31-32.
57. Id. at 32.
58. Id. at 32-33.
59. Id. at 31.
60. Id. at 34.
61. Id. at 35-36.
62. Id. at 36.
63. 17 U.S. 316 (1819); VERMEULE, supra note 16, at 37.
64. VERMEULE, supra note 16, at 37.
[Vol. 82:405416
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scenario-abuses targeted at the speech of political minorities,
dissenters, or opponents of the regime." 65
Far from being an advocate for precautionary principles,
Vermeule notes that they are vulnerable to various
counterarguments-mainly that their costs are too high relative to
the probability of the risk they guard against or that they actually
increase the likelihood that the harm will come about.6 6 While
precautionary principles, at least in their stronger versions, call for
maximal protections against risk, Vermeule argues that
constitutional designers and interpreters would do better to pursue
optimal protections by adopting the so-called "mature position." Like
some versions of the cost-benefit approach to first-order risk
analysis, this model asks managers of second-order risks to "take
optimal precautions, according to a calculus that weighs all relevant
risks of action and inaction."67
We first encountered Professor Vermeule's work on these issues
in the course of our earlier effort on anti-evasion doctrines.68 We
wondered whether AEDs were valuable enough to offset their costs,
which included the introduction of doctrinal complexity and elevated
decision costs, among others.6 9 Vermeule's work encouraged us to see
AEDs as part of a judicial attempt to achieve the mature position by
aiming for optimal enforcement of constitutional principles. 70 AEDs
permit courts to revisit a particular area of constitutional law and
adjust doctrine in light of subsequent emergent risks-they furnish
a calibrated ex post remedy to risk, as opposed to a maximal ex ante
one.71 Relatedly, the existence of AEDs provides evidence that, in
designing constitutional doctrine, the Court operates at varying
levels of knowledge concerning the dangers presented by the
challenged activity. As we explained in our previous article, "the
Court sets initial decision rules based on the relevant information
65. Id. at 41 (footnote omitted). Other precautionary principles he discusses
include due process rights to impartial tribunals, id. at 43-49; the reasonable doubt
rule, id. at 44-45; and prophylactic rules like the Miranda warnings, id. at 45.
66. See id. at 54 (sketching the counterarguments); id. at 54-76 (discussing the.
precautionary design and interpretive elements in light of the counterarguments).
67. Id. at 52.
68. Denning & Kent, Anti-Euasion Doctrines, supra note 6.
69. Id. at 1804-13 (discussing trade-offs).
70. Id. at 1813 ("Despite these tradeoffs, we believe that AEDs are, on balance,
valuable in constitutional law [because they] embody what Professor Hirchman
termed 'the mature position."').
71. VERMEULE, supra note 16, at 72 ("[A]nother argument against precautions
is that ex ante safeguards are unnecessary in light of the availability of ex post
remedies .... ).
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available to it and then revises and supplements those rules based
on risk considerations that subsequently arise."7 2 In other words,
just like first-order risk managers, the Court often acts in contexts of
"uncertainty" and "ignorance," crafting (and re-crafting) decision
rules to match the different levels of knowledge it has at different
points in time.73
In the next section, we make a fuller case for the aptness and
benefits of viewing this process-i.e., the process by which judges
create doctrine through the choice and use of decision rules-as a
species of political risk regulation. Our contribution to the discussion
began by Vermeule and others is unique because we adopt here a
wide-angle view, one that moves beyond particular responses to
constitutional risk74 or the Court's performance as risk regulator in
specific areas.75 The addition of Berman's two-output thesis,
moreover, makes explicit what is at best implicit in other treatments
of judicial risk regulation: that the decision rules themselves reflect
judicial responses to perceived risk. To be sure, questions about
judicial risk regulation abound, and we will identify some of those in
Part III. Here, however, we simply want to explore the contours of
judicial risk regulation.
C. Doctrinal Design as Political Risk Regulation
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the idea of "risk
regulation" can apply as equally to constitutions and judicial
pronouncements targeting second-order risks as it does to
administrative regulations designed to address first-order risks. In
fact, the assessment and management of political risk stretches back
further into our history than its more contemporary cousin. In this
section, we situate the choice of decision rules by courts, the
Supreme Court in particular, into this tradition, arguing that such
choices should be understood and studied as a particular type of
political risk regulation. Ample evidence exists in the Court's own
jurisprudence that the Justices have "often spoken the prose of risk
72. Denning & Kent, Anti-Evasion Doctrines, supra note 6, at 1815.
73. See id. (suggesting that AEDs and process by which they are created
enables Court, over time, to reach "more balanced risk assessment" as new
information is made known).
74. See VERMEULE, supra note 16 (critiquing precautionary principles in
constitutional law).
75. See Nash, supra note 19 (discussing the Supreme Court's risk analysis in
criminal law); Tushnet, supra note 19 (discussing First Amendment doctrine through
lens of risk regulation).
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regulation," 76 whether or not they were conscious of it.77 Indeed, one
can recognize examples of both precautionary and cost-benefit
approaches to perceived risks in the different decision rules
implemented by the Court.
We earlier observed that decision rules occupy points along a
deference spectrum.7 8 The transition from more to less deference
reflects a corresponding rise in the perceived level of risk to
constitutional principle by official action. At one end of the spectrum,
where the perceived risks are low, the Court takes a very deferential
view that presumes official action comports with the Constitution79
As risk perception rises, the Court relaxes its presumption of
constitutionality and demands more evidence from the government
that its action either will not trench on constitutional principles, or
that the violation of constitutional principle is necessary to avoid or
reduce the risk of some other harm that the law seeks to prevent or
mitigate. In some cases, the burden on government is heavy indeed,
approaching some strong version of the precautionary principle
described above.80
Strict scrutiny, for example, is probably the closest doctrinal
analogue to a generic precautionary principle we have in
constitutional law. Under the "modern test . . . legislation will be
upheld against constitutional challenge only if 'necessary' or
'narrowly tailored' to promote a 'compelling' governmental
interest."81 As Professor Fallon has documented, the test emerged in
the 1960s, making "nearly simultaneous appearances in multiple
corners of constitutional law."82 In his telling, strict scrutiny fit the
bill as a "generic constitutional test capable of broad application" to
"protect 'preferred' or fundamental rights that were too important to
76. Vermeule, Political Risk, supra note 18, at 2.
77. See also Tushnet, supra note 19, at 103, 104 (observing that "free speech
doctrine [is] a response to risk"; and specifically, "First Amendment doctrine is at its
core about the correct response to the fact that speech can increase the risk of social
harm.").
78. Supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)
("[L]egislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to the
Court with a presumption of constitutionality. . . .").
80. Supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text; see also Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) ("Any system of prior restraints of expression comes
to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.").
81. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267,
1268 (2007).
82. Id. at 1270.
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be enforced by a rational basis test, but that the Supreme Court
could not reasonably define as wholly categorical or unyielding." 83
To put it another way, strict scrutiny developed as a response to
the Justices' perceptions that governmental actions posed
inordinately high risks to certain constitutional principles. We
analogize strict scrutiny to the precautionary principle because it84
shifts the burden of proof to the proponent (government) of the
potentially harmful activity (law or regulation) to demonstrate that
it is "safe" (i.e., poses no danger to the constitutional principle the
standard of review protects).
By contrast, in the classic form of rational basis review, the
Court demonstrates near-total deference to government officials, as
it recently confirmed in the context of an Equal Protection Clause
challenge to a municipal financing scheme.85 Writing for the
majority, Justice Breyer described rational basis review in the
following terms:
This Court has long held that "a classification neither
involving fundamental rights nor proceeding along suspect
lines . . . cannot run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if
there is a rational relationship between the disparity of
treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose." We
have made clear in analogous contexts that, where "ordinary
commercial transactions" are at issue, rational basis review
requires deference to reasonable underlying legislative
judgments. And we have repeatedly pointed out that
"[1]egislatures have especially broad latitude in creating
classifications and distinctions in tax statutes." 86
The Court's application of rational basis review thus suggests
that it perceives the risks involved to be markedly different from
those present in cases applying strict scrutiny. Where rational basis
forms the standard of review, the Court implicitly concludes either
that the risks to constitutional principle are minimal or that judicial
involvement generates other risks that counsel abstinence (or both).
That the Court undertakes this tacit weighing of risks, including
those that may accompany its own action or inaction, hints at the
83. Id.
84. Or at least one version of strict scrutiny does this. We return to this point
below. See infra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
85. See Amour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2079-82 (2012)
(upholding distinctions made in financing arrangement under rational basis
scrutiny).
86. Id. at 2079-80 (internal citations omitted).
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type of informal cost-benefit analysis described by some scholars in
the context of first-order risks.
The cost-benefit approach is even better reflected in some of the
Court's other tests. In between strict scrutiny and rational basis, for
example, lies intermediate scrutiny, in which "laws will be upheld so
long as they serve some sort of a significant/substantial/important
governmental interest and are reasonably well tailored to that
purpose (i.e., not unreasonably overbroad)."87 Or consider the forms
of interest balancing that various Justices have endorsed over the
years. Justice Marshall, for example, rejected tiered scrutiny in
equal protection cases in favor of a sliding scale in which judicial
scrutiny "var[ied] with 'the constitutional and societal importance of
the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of
the basis upon which the particular classification is drawn."'8 8
Justice Breyer has urged something similar in reviewing Second
Amendment challenges to gun control laws. In his Heller dissent,
Justice Breyer argued that the right of private persons to possess
handguns for self-defense ought to be weighed against the possibility
that such protections could endanger public safety by increasing gun
crime.8 9 Finally, the Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence has
long centered around "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries designed
to allow careful examination and weighing of all the relevant
circumstances."so These tests tend to resemble cost-benefit
approaches to risk.
In addition to the Justices themselves, those attempting to
comprehend and explain constitutional doctrine also speak "the
prose of risk regulation."9 1 A look at recent, sophisticated treatments
of constitutional doctrine shows that, consciously or not, scholars
frequently employ risk regulation concepts when seeking to
understand the Court's decision rules and' the rationales that
underlie them. Professor Fallon's article on strict scrutiny, for
example, provides the following description (reminiscent of risk
87. Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test that Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 801 (summarizing survey
of various applications of intermediate scrutiny in free speech cases).
88. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 460 (1985)
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
89. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 682 (2008) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
90. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
91. Supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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analysis) of how the "narrow tailoring" and "compelling interest"
prongs of strict scrutiny interact:
[T]he effort to identify compelling interests and to determine
the adequacy of regulatory tailoring is likely to involve fluid,
two-way traffic in which assessments of ends and means
occur simultaneously-at least in cases in which challenged
governmental regulations, viewed realistically, will at best
merely reduce risks or incidents of harm more or less
effectively than would other regulations.... The Court must
determine whether infringements of constitutional rights,
which can be more or less grievous, can be justified in view of
the benefits likely to be achieved, the scope of infringement of
protected freedoms, and the available alternatives.92
Like Professor Fallon, Peter Rubin has discussed the Court's use
of strict scrutiny in terms of "costs," "risks," and "harms."93 When
considering the use of race in drawing electoral districts, Professor
Rubin argues, a court ought first to "identify[] which of the possible
risks and harms associated with the government's use of race are
present" and then "assess whether the costs that in fact attend the
use of race . . . are justified by any sufficiently strong legislative
purposes."94 After considering the availability of race-neutral
alternatives, "[a reviewing court] would have to consider whether ...
the use of race is sufficiently harmful that a polity seeking to achieve
these particular purposes should be required to bear whatever costs
are attendant upon using such alternatives."95
In her work on the First Amendment, Leslie Kendrick has
similarly explored, in risk regulation terms, the scope of and
justifications for the Court's decision rules in that area. For example,
Professor Kendrick argues that the Court grounds its strict review of
facial classifications of expression on the perceived risk that such
classifications can easily mask an illicit or impermissible purpose
92. Fallon, supra note 81, at 1333 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1331 ("[I]t
... seems impossible to think sensibly about compelling governmental interests and
the narrow tailoring requirement as if they were sequentially isolated components of
a bifurcated two-step inquiry . . . . In a practical sense, the dispositive,
proportionality-like question becomes whether a particular, incremental reduction in
risk justifies a particular infringement of protected rights in light of other reasonably
available, more or less costly and more or less effective, alternatives.").
93. Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive
Approach to Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 9 (2000).
94. Id. at 123.
95. Id.
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and are thus deserving of precautionary treatment.96 Additionally,
Professor Kendrick describes the Court's efforts to curb chilling
effects on speech in terms of cost-benefit analysis:
[T]he identification of a chilling effect [first] implies a
judgment that a given legal rule will overdeter protected
speech as compared with its deterrence of unprotected speech
and furtherance of other legitimate governmental interests.
In essence, the court performs a type of cost-benefit analysis
reminiscent of the Hand formula, in which it compares the
benefits of a rule against the probability that protected
speech will be chilled, with the protected speech being given
appropriate weight as an affirmative and preferred value.
Second, to arrive at a remedy, the court must consider the
cost-benefit profiles of possible alternative rules and select
the one that provides the optimal balance of reducing chilling
and still furthering legitimate goals.97
In conducting these evaluations, Professor Kendrick further
notes that courts are often confronted with a host of information
gaps about the law's deterrent effect, the value of the protected
speech, and the probability of actual chilling.9 8 Thus, when courts
seek to assess and manage the political risks associated with chilling
speech, they operate in circumstances similar to those of
"uncertainty" and "ignorance" in the first-order context.
Our own work, as well, contains hints of a risk-regulation
approach to different areas. Denning has argued that the dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine's decision rules should guard against the
96. See Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231,
253 (2012) ("For example, a categorical rule against facial discrimination on the basis
of certain classifications may reflect the position that even the appearance of a
suspect purpose is suspicious."); id. at 264 (commenting, about Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Rev., 460 U.S. 575 (1983), that though "the Court
held that evidence of invidious legislative intent was not necessary to render the law
suspect, its reason appeared to be that facial discrimination against the press
presents such a high risk of invidious intent that it is disallowed even when no
evidence of such intent exists."); id. at 265 ("Minneapolis Star thus suggests that a
long historical association with suppression is sufficient to render a communication-
based classification facially suspect."); id. at 275 (on content-based rules: "One
explanation for this rule is that subject-matter and viewpoint classifications have
such a high probability of concealing an illicit purpose that one may confidently infer
such a purpose from the fact of the classification.") (footnote omitted).
97. Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1633, 1682 (2013).
98. Id. at 1682-83.
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risks to political union attending commercial friction among states.
9 9
In particular, he concluded that anti-discrimination rules best
served this function, as opposed to the balancing of benefits and
burdens to commerce that, if applied rigorously, would likely
overprotect interstate commerce. 10 0 Kent has described the remedial
system applied by the Court in takings cases-an insistence that
regulatory takings be compensated rather than prohibited-as
striking a balance between the risks posed to private property by
governmental action, on the one hand, and the risks posed to the
general welfare by individual holdouts, on the other.101 Finally, Kent
has explained the heightened scrutiny the Court applies to land use
exactions in terms of the political risks likely to attend them, and he
has argued that monetary exactions in the land use context pose
many of these same risks. 102
The foregoing examples suffice to demonstrate that many of the
doctrinal formulae employed by the Court-tiered scrutiny, First
Amendment tests, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, takings
jurisprudence, etc.-can be generally understood as judicial
attempts to manage or regulate perceived risks that pose varying
levels of danger to the specific constitutional values or principles the
decision rules constituting the doctrine were designed to implement.
At the same time, specific applications of the same formulae in
different contexts also seem to vary according to shifting risk
perceptions among the Justices. In his article on strict scrutiny for
example, Professor Fallon identified "three distinguishable versions
of strict judicial scrutiny, all conducted pursuant to the same form of
words." 103
One stringent version allows infringements of constitutional
rights only to avert catastrophic or nearly catastrophic
harms. Another, which views legislation as appropriately
suspect when likely to reflect constitutionally forbidden
purposes, aims at "smoking out" illicit governmental motives.
A third version of strict scrutiny, partly belying the test's
name, is not terribly strict at all and amounts to little more
99. Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 484-85 (2008).
100. Id. at 493-94.
101. Michael B. Kent, Jr., Construing the Canon: An Exegesis of Regulatory
Takings Jurisprudence After Lingle v. Chevron,'16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 63, 87-88
(2008).
102. Michael B. Kent, Jr., Theoretical Tension and Doctrinal Discord: Analyzing
Development Impact Fees as Takings, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1833, 1853-59 (2010).
103. Fallon, supra note 81, at 1271.
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than weighted balancing, with the scales tipped slightly to
favor the protected right.104
Professor Bhagwat finds similar variation in the Court's
application of intermediate scrutiny. "In certain areas," such as
commercial speech and regulation of charitable solicitation, "the
Court has been extremely speech protective, consistently upholding
claims against even quite powerful governmental regulatory
interests."1 0 5 On the other hand, "in the area of regulating sexually
oriented businesses, the Court . . . has been extraordinarily
consistent in rejecting constitutional claims . . . ."i06 The Court has
also been unreceptive to content-neutral regulation of symbolic
conduct. 107 In fact, he concludes, "[t]he pattern of cases is so clear in
these two areas of law that one could make a convincing case that
the Court has in fact adopted a categorical balancing approach in
both areas and resolved the balance against speech claims."10 8
These diverse applications of the same doctrinal formulae raise
the specter of yet another analogy to the regulation of first-order
risks. Fallon concludes that "individual Justices tend to vary their
applications of strict scrutiny based on their personal assessments of
the importance of the right in question."109 If true, this assertion
suggests that cultural cognition is as much a force in doctrinal
formation as are precautionary and cost-benefit principles. Put
differently, perhaps some quantity of constitutional doctrine
develops as a result of the Justices' individual worldviews and
cultural commitments. But even so, that strikes us as simply
another way of saying that the creation and application of doctrinal
tests is a function of the Justices' perceptions of risk and their
attempts to regulate that risk in constitutional adjudication.
III. IMPLICATIONS AND AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
As developed in Part II, we agree with Professor Vermeule that
risk-based concepts and theories can be applied helpfully to much of
what goes on in constitutional design and interpretation.
Additionally, building on his ideas, we have argued that the creation
and application of judicial doctrine through decision rules is a form
of risk regulation-whether or not the Justices consciously
104. Id.
105. Bhagwat, supra note 87, at 816.
106. Id. at 817.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Fallon, supra note 81, at 1271.
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understand it to be-and likewise can be studied profitably as such.
There are a number of important implications that theseinsights
have for constitutional law generally, and several questions that
they raise, as well. In this Part, we will discuss the implications and
flag the questions that they raise in hopes of treating them more
comprehensively in future work.
As an initial matter, there are two obvious payoffs for the
doctrine-as-risk-regulation model. First, it allows the circumstance
of decision rules creation to be reframed as an ongoing process
rather than a one-time event. In addition, the risk regulation model
provides a yardstick with which commentators can measure the
efficacy of existing doctrine in the optimal implementation of
constitutional principles.
But we think that there are less obvious implications as well. A
risk regulation model of doctrine has some explanatory power for
aspects of constitutional law that are commonly critiqued: (1) that
the Court often protects some rights--even unenumerated ones-
while underenforcing other rights explicitly mentioned in the
Constitution; (2) that constitutional doctrine is too formulaic and
complex, which undermines the legitimacy of judicial decisions; and
(3) that the Court often inconsistently applies its own decision rules
without acknowledging that it is deviating from the rules previously
laid down. Critics frequently ascribe "politics" as the reason for these
alleged deficiencies. We argue that changing perceptions of risk
might furnish an alternative explanation.
Taking the doctrine-as-risk-regulation model seriously, however,
raises important questions that merit further investigation. We raise
three in this section, some of which we hope to examine further in
future work. First, should we trust judicial perceptions of and
responses to risk? Second, what influences risk assessment among
judges, and are those influences (and resulting assessments)
normatively defensible? Third, what is the connection-if any-
between judicial risk assessment and attempts to regulate perceived
risks through verbal formulae such as those the Court uses in its
doctrine?
A. Implications
1. Decision Rule Choice is a Process, Not Event
Though we have alluded to this point before in our previous
work,110 it bears emphasizing here that the creation and
110. See Denning & Kent, Anti-Evasion Doctrines, supra note 6, at 1832 ("AEDs
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maintenance of doctrinal rules is an ongoing process.11 ' The Court
often adjusts doctrine over time in response to adaptive behavior by
officials, additional information, or changes in circumstances.112
Suzanna Sherry recently argued that the Justices' evolving
understanding of the facts on the ground can cause the Court to shift
its doctrinal rules, sometimes without explicit acknowledgement by
the Court.113 The persistence of Court-created AEDs, moreover,
suggests that doctrine creation involves a feedback loop. The Court
creates a decision rule, then adjusts it over time as circumstances
dictate.11 4 In most cases the catalyst for the adjustment is an altered
perception of the danger to a particular constitutional principle.115
Doctrine therefore, is adaptive; it changes in response to changes
in circumstances or, as we have described it here, in response to
judicial perceptions of risk."16 As Professor Fallon and others have
demonstrated, for example, strict scrutiny did not emerge fully
formed from William Brennan's skull. Rather, it evolved over time as
the Court struggled for a response to particular types of
constitutional risk.11 7 As Fallon usefully reminds us, even a Court's
application of the same decision rules can vary with context.11 8 This
serve as a reminder that doctrinal formation is not a static, one-step process, but
rather is dynamic and ongoing.").
111. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 19, at 124:
There is a long-standing scholarly tradition arguing that, as cases
accumulate, courts are driven to move from standards to rules. Experience
accumulates, and judges get familiar with some generic features of
situations they repeatedly confront. They become increasingly confident
that they can devise rules that capture so many of the normatively relevant
features of those situations that the benefits of ex ante guidance from rules
come to outweigh the benefits of applying standards after the event.
112. Denning & Kent, Anti-Evasion Doctrines, supra note 6, at 1814-15,
1827-28.
113. Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. ILL. L.
REV. 145, 146-47.
114. Denning & Kent, Anti-Evasion Doctrines, supra note 6, at 1815.
115. See id. (noting that the Court revises and supplements its decision rules
"based on risk considerations that subsequently arise").
116. See Tushnet, supra note 19, at 125 (observing that a
"rules/exceptions/exceptions approach is actually quite standard" in constitutional
law).
117. Fallon, supra note 81; see also Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the
Compelling State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355 (2006)
(describing the evolution of strict scrutiny).
118. Fallon, supra note 81, at 1271.
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gives doctrine, and constitutional law generally, a kind of fluidity
that means very few questions are settled for all time. However
disconcerting this lack of permanence may seem at first blush, there
may nonetheless be ameliorative effects-i.e., saving the Court from
what might be called judicial sclerosis that can stunt the law's
growth.1 19
2. Furnishes a Metric for Evaluating Doctrinal Rules
Another feature of the risk regulation model of doctrine is that it
provides a frame for debates about how the Court should "regulate"
with regard to a particular constitutional principle. As advocates of
cost-benefit analyses debate advocates of precautionary principles
over the proper regulatory response to various first-order risks,
advocates of different doctrinal rules can debate in similar fashion
the proper judicial response to second-order risks. Although
arguments that this or that doctrinal rule over- or under-enforces a
particular constitutional principle are common fare in constitutional
scholarship,1 20 the risk regulation model strikes us as a way to bring
questions of appropriate enforcement into sharper focus. In addition,
the model furnishes a yardstick with which one might measure the
efficacy of particular decision rules against the appropriate
standard, wherever one ends up locating it.
3. The Model's Explanatory Power
In addition to illuminating the process of decision rule creation
and providing a metric for decision rule evaluation, we think the
doctrine-as-risk-regulation model offers some less obvious (but no
less important) benefits. In this subsection, we describe a few
additional ways to cash out the risk regulation model.
Nearly all critiques of constitutional law frequently contain one
or more of the following complaints. First, commentators criticize the
Court for creating a sort of rights caste system that recognizes and
vigorously enforces some rights-even those lacking specific mention
in the Constitution-while providing minimal protection for others.
For example, scholars decry the Court's relative lack of interest in
119. For two different arguments that the perpetually unsettled nature of many
constitutional questions is a beneficial feature of our system, see generally LOUIS
MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2001); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Chaos
and the Court, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 110 (1991).
120. See generally Sager, supra note 22; David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of
Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190 (1988).
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protecting "mere" economic rights as opposed to "civil" liberties
involving procreation and contraception. 1 2 1 Second, constitutional
law is criticized as being too laden with a complex and confusing
skein of doctrinal formulae that transfers power from the sovereign
People to the Court charged with maintaining and applying those
rules. 122 Doctrine creates distance between the document and the
People, thus robbing the Court's decisions of legitimacy that they
might have if that distance were reduced. Finally, the Court is often
charged with inconsistency in the application of the decision rules
that it does create, producing outcomes different than prior
application of those rules would suggest. The Court will do this,
moreover, without explicit acknowledgment that it is applying the
rules in different ways or that it has created a different standard of
review.123
Some of these same critics then put the inconsistencies and
changes in direction down to "politics," meaning that changes in
doctrine or the Court's agenda are driven by the partisan or
ideological preferences of the Justices. 124 One recent critic alleged
that the Court's decisions were so driven by the Justices' ideological
preferences that it had lost its authority to be considered a court of
law. 125 This extreme cynicism is certainly not something the Justices
themselves admit, 126 suggesting that they are liars, that they suffer
121. See, e.g., RICHARD EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT: HOW TO REVIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY (2008); James W. Ely, Jr.,
Whatever Happened to the Contract Clause?, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 371 (2010);
Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation
and Reburial, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 34.
122. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Foreword: The
Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26 (2000); Nagel, supra note 4.
123. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 (1972) (discussing the emergence of a standard of
review producing "equal protection bite without 'strict scrutiny"' without explicit
acknowledgement that a new standard of review was employed); Calvin Massey, The
New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 946 (2004)
(noting that results in Grutter and Lawrence were different than the standards of
review purportedly applied by the Court might otherwise suggest).
124. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); compare id., with Richard A.
Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 31, 39 (2005) (arguing that constitutional courts are "political courts" but
denying that "political" and "partisan" are necessarily synonymous).
125. ERIC J. SEGALL, SUPREME MYTHS: WHY THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT A
COURT AND WHY ITS JUSTICES ARE NOT JUDGES (2012).
126. See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, Without a Paddle, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 27,
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from collective false consciousness, or that a more charitable
explanation exists.
Not being overly cynical ourselves, 127 we suggest that viewing
changes in agenda and doctrine through the lens of risk regulation
provides an alternative explanation for the Court's (and individual
Justices') behavior over time. First, we will look at changes in the
Court's agenda generally, then examine changes in doctrine, and at
an even more granular level, look at differences in application of the
same decision rules. In each case, we argue, shifts can reflect
changes in perceived risk that produce a judicial reaction. (As we
made clear earlier, however, we do not claim that ideology plays no
role in risk perception. 128)
a. Explains Changes in Court's Agenda
Our first claim is that changes in perceptions of risk can explain
shifts in the Court's agenda. The early Marshall Court, for example,
viewed states as dangerous rivals to the national polity established
by the Constitution, and many of its decisions accordingly imposed
limits on state power.1 29 By the time of Marshall's death, however,
new Justices with different perspectives on the threat (or lack
thereof) posed by state power began to limit Marshall's early
2010, at 34, 41. Toobin's article quotes Justice Stephen Breyer as saying:
There is a tremendous temptation for journalists, for readers, and the
average person who thinks about the Court, particularly today, to think
these are a group of junior-league politicians, and what they are doing is
deciding things on a political basis. That, I think, plays virtually no role in
what we do at the Court.
Id. For the Breyer quotation and similar denials that the Court ought to decide
according to political predilections of its members from Supreme Court nominees, see
Todd E. Pettys, Judicial Discretion in Constitutional Cases, 26 J.L. & POL. 123
(2011).
127. Denning & Kent, Anti-Anti-Evasion, supra note 12, at 416 (looking for
explanations for anti-anti-evasion other than "cynicism or tautology").
128. Supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT:
THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 62 (1985) (describing the early Marshall
Court as "a time of vigorous affirmation of national authority and of vigorous
enforcement of constitutional limitations on the states"); GEORGE L. HASKINS &
HERBERT A. JOHNSON, 2 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-15, at 15 (1981) ("Not only were
the advocates of States' rights vociferous and powerful, but large sections of the
inland populace were opposed to centralized government in any form .... ").
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decisions restricting that power and, in fact, "managed to alter
constitutional directions without tearing apart the fabric of the
Marshall Court heritage." 30
Perhaps the most dramatic shift occurred in the mid-1930s-a
century after Taney inherited the center chair-when the Court
relinquished its dual role as (1) referee of the boundary between
state and federal power (and concomitant guarantor of some
quantum of exclusive state power) and (2) the last word on the
propriety of state regulation of private economic relationships.131 In
the famous Carolene Products footnote, Chief Justice Stone
expressed confidence in the ability of political safeguards to prevent
overreaching in most cases, the exceptions being where a provision
of the Bill of Rights was invoked; where racial, religious or other
"discrete and insular" minorities were affected; or where
obstructions existed to the operation of "those political processes
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation."1 32 In so doing, observed Professor Currie,
"Stone established the Court's agenda for the next fifty years." 133
Professor Powe writes that the footnote closed "[l]engthy chapters of
American constitutional history" in favor of a "more aggressive
concern for civil liberties and civil rights."1 34
But if in carrying out this new agenda, "[t]he Warren Court
completed the eradication of federalism, once a cherished and
innovative part of the American constitutional order," 36 the
130. Gunther, supra note 123, at 5; see also CURRIE, supra note 129, at 62
(arguing that between 1820 and Marshall's death in 1835 "[t]he Court increasingly
refused to extend the limits it had found imposed on the states, and it increasingly
revealed divisions as Marshall's longtime colleagues were gradually replaced by men
of a new generation"); CARL B. SWISHER, V HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836-64, at 7 (1974) ("Readjustments were in
the offing in the relations between the federal government and the states, between
the states and private economic interests, within the realm of money and banking,
and between the North and the South on issues of race relations.").
131. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND
CENTURY, 1888-1986, at 245 (1990) ("Amid the thunder of the great economic
controversies that destroyed economic due process, the contract clause, and the
concept of limited federal power, the Supreme Court of the 1930s quietly began to
work on the agenda of the future: criminal procedure, civil rights, and civil
liberties.").
132. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
133. CURRIE, supra note 131, at 244.
134. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE:
1789-2008, at 216 (2009).
135. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 494
(2000).
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Rehnquist Court demonstrated that few things in constitutional law
are ever settled for all time. No sooner had Justice Blackmun's
opinion in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authorityl36
driven a stake through the heart of judicially enforced federalism,
than Justice Rehnquist's prediction that federalism would "in time
again command the support of a majority of this Court" bore fruit. 13 7
In a number of areas-the Commerce Clause,138 sovereign
immunity, 139 commandeeringl 40-the Rehnquist Court reasserted its
role in policing the boundaries between state and federal power. As a
result, in the words of Justice O'Connor, maintenance of "the
remaining essentials of state sovereignty" was not entirely left to
Congress's "underdeveloped capacity for self-restraint."1 41
For us, these shifts can be explained as a rational response to the
Court's recognition that it cannot do everything.1 42 It must triage
issues, weighing carefully which cases will receive its attention, and
which can be left to the lower courts or, perhaps, to other branches
or levels of government. This requires more than a general feel for
the limits of the institution's power. Even where it feels competent to
intervene, we think the issues the Court takes up and how it decides
them implies some judgment about risk. To borrow from Nash's
framework again, the decision to decide 43 suggests that the Court
has, at least, concluded that (1) there is risk, and (2) "the showing of
risk [is] sufficient to justify [judicial] action" of some sort.144
136. 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976)).
137. Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
139. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
140. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
141. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 588 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For various perspectives
on Rehnquist Court federalism, see THE REHNQUIST LEGACY 187-298 (Craig M.
Bradley ed., 2005).
142. Cf. Andrew B. Coan, Judicial Capacity and the Substance of Constitutional
Law, 122 YALE L.J. 422, 424 (2012) ("[Clourts can decide only a small fraction of the
constitutional issues generated by the American government.").
143. See, e.g., H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1991).
144. Nash, supra note 19, at 192.
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b. Explains Inter-Doctrinal Variety
Of course, not all risks are the same. Even if judicial doctrine can
be understood as a form of risk regulation, there is no reason to
expect that either the Justices' perceptions of the magnitude of risk
or the Court's response to it will be generic. In this vein, Professor
Vermeule stresses that the mature position-i.e., the response that
aims for optimal enforcement of a constitutional principle-will
differ for risks depending on a number of variables. 145 Consider
again the significance of the Court's use of strict scrutiny as
contrasted with the classic forml4 6 of rational basis review in equal
protection cases. The use of strict scrutiny in racial classification
cases suggests a judicial perception that the use of race in conferring
benefits or imposing burdens on individuals poses such a risk of
harm to the constitutional principle of equality that it will be
permitted only after satisfying the Court, first, that very good
reasons exist for its use and, second, that those reasons cannot be
achieved without it.147
Other classifications, by contrast, are not perceived as posing
such a risk and are therefore reviewed using deferential decision
rules such as rational basis. In Nordlinger v. Hahn,148 for example,
the Court upheld California's Proposition 13, which imposed limits
on property tax rates and the degree to which those rates could rise
year after year. These limits however, were "subject to the exception
that new construction or a change of ownership trigger[ed] a
145. VERMEULE, supra note 16, at 17.
146. We use the term "classic form" to refer to the traditional, almost completely
deferential form of scrutiny, as opposed to rational basis with "bite." See infra notes
167-77 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418-19 (2013):
Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their
very nature odious to a free people, and therefore are contrary to our
traditions and hence constitutionally suspect.
To implement these canons, judicial review must begin from the position
that any official action that treats a person differently on account of his race
or ethnic origin is inherently suspect. Strict scrutiny is a searching
examination, and it is the government that bears the burden to prove that
the reasons for any [racial] classification [are] clearly identified and
unquestionably legitimate.
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
148. 505 U.S. 1 (1992).
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reassessment up to current appraised value."1 49 Thus, "[r]eal
property [was] assessed at values related to the value of the property
at the time it is acquired by the taxpayer rather than to the value it
ha[d] in the current real estate market."o50 Plaintiffs challenged
Proposition 13 on the ground that it discriminated against new
purchasers in favor of existing residents of neighborhoods
arbitrarily. 151 Because the classification was not a "suspect" one-
meaning that it did not "jeopardize[] the exercise of a fundamental
right or categorize[ on the basis of an inherently suspect
characteristic" 5 2-the Court applied a rational basis test. In this
version 5 3 of its rational basis test, moreover, the Court presumed
the existence of a legitimate interest, even hypothesizing possible
reasons for the distinctive treatment regardless of whether those
were the actual ones invoked by the state, and concluded that
Proposition 13 was defensible under any one of those reasons.
154
Justice Blackmun closed his majority opinion in Nordlinger with
an explanation of the Court's deferential attitude towards the state,
despite the possible unfairness produced by Proposition 13:
Time and again ... this Court has made clear in the rational-
basis context that the "Constitution presumes that, absent
some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions
will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and
that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter
how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted."
Certainly, California's grand experiment appears to vest
benefits in a broad, powerful, and entrenched segment of
society, and, as the Court of Appeal surmised, ordinary
democratic processes may be unlikely to prompt its
reconsideration or repeal. Yet many wise and well-
intentioned laws suffer from the same malady. [Proposition
13] is not palpably arbitrary, and we must decline
petitioner's request to upset the will of the people of
California.15 5
149. Id. at 5.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 7-8.
152. Id. at 10.
153. See infra notes 167-77 and accompanying text.
154. Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 12-13; see also id. at 15 (noting that "the Equal
Protection Clause does not demand for purposes of rational-basis review that a
legislature .. . actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its
classification").
155. Id. at 17-18 (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)) (internal
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Thus, in contrast to the Court's assumption that racial
classifications posed risks that were unlikely to be outweighed by
any countervailing benefit, the assumption in Nordlinger seems to
have been that whatever risks of unfairness or arbitrariness existed
were either minimal, were not outweighed by the costs of judicial
second-guessing of California's policy judgment, could ultimately be
remedied through the political process, or some combination of the
three.
. Decision rules that implement structural principles likewise vary
according to risk perception. Take the dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine (DCCD). As one of us has argued, the animating principle
behind the DCCD is the prevention of commercial friction among
states that might fray the bonds of political union.16 6 The Court has
concluded that laws explicitly (or covertly) discriminating against
out-of-state commerce pose a particular risk of sparking retaliatory
cycles that can produce such friction. For this reason, to be upheld,
such laws require proof that protectionism is not motivating the
legislation and that the state lacks less discriminatory means to
achieve its end-a version of heightened scrutiny, but one different
in kind from the strict scrutiny employed in equal protection
cases.16 7 By contrast, truly nondiscriminatory state regulations
nevertheless alleged to burden commerce are subject to a deferential
form of balancing where the challenger must show the burdens
"clearly exceed" the benefits flowing from the law or regulation.1 58
But as the Court has made clear in its judicially-created exceptions
to the DCCD, not all discrimination is seen to pose the same risks.
Discrimination when the state is acting as a "market participant"1 5 9
or that made in favor of a "public entity" are regarded as carrying
much less risk than that motivated by pure economic
protectionism. 160
citations omitted).
156. Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417 (2008).
157. Id. at 451. See generally id. at 441-43 (describing the emergence of the anti-
discrimination rule).
158. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
159. See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (upholding regulation
requiring state-owned cement plant to fill orders of in-state residents before filling
those from out-of-state residents in time of shortage; held, state is acting as
participant in the cement market and may choose with whom it wishes to deal).
160. United Haulers v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 343 (2007) ("[W]hen a law favors in-state business over out-of-state competition,
rigorous scrutiny is appropriate because the law is often the product of simple
economic protectionism. Laws favoring local government, by contrast, may be
435
TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW
Examples could be multiplied, but the point is simply one that
we (and others) have made elsewhere. Because direct enforcement of
the Constitution does not often go far to decide cases, decision rules
are necessary. 16 1  Thus, the oft-complained of "formulaic
Constitution" may simply be the price that we pay for having a
Court (and a judiciary) that seeks optimal, as opposed to minimal or
maximal enforcement of diverse constitutional principles.1
62
The risk regulation model offers further support for both the
existence of doctrinal formulae generally and for the diverse forms
those formulae take. Risks to constitutional principle are not
uniform; judicial enforcement, therefore, should likewise be
variegated. As new risks materialize or as official action adapts to
old doctrine, perhaps seeking to evade it,163 new decision rules can
emerge. Similarly, as perceptions of risk change, the Court, too, can
adapt. Take gender classifications: Until the early 1970s, they were
thought to pose little risk to equality principles because of
commonly-held assumptions about gender roles.1 64 When those
assumptions began to be questioned, the Court first subjected them
to rational basis with "bite,"1 6 5 then to a newly-created intermediate
scrutiny that eliminated the most egregious gender discrimination
while preserving classifications intended to aid women. 166
c. Explains Intra-Doctrinal Inconsistency
Finally, as the use of rational basis to strike down arbitrary
gender classifications demonstrates, the Court has frequently
employed standards of review in ways that produce surprising
results. Since Gerald Gunther described the emergence of a less-
deferential rational basis review in the early 1970s, it has become a
mainstay in the Court's doctrinal repertoire. Consider the use of
directed toward any number of legitimate goals unrelated to protectionism.")
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
161. See ROOSEVELT, supra note 2.
162. Denning & Kent, Anti-Evasion Doctrines, supra note 6, at 1817-26.
163. Id. at 1827-28.
164. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding state
prohibition on bartending by women).
165. See Gunther, supra note 123, at 18-20 (describing the less deferential form
of rational basis used in cases decided by the Court in the 1971 Term).
166. Compare United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (invalidating
Virginia Military Institute's male-only admissions policy), with Michael M. v.
Superior Court of Sonoma Cnty., 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (concluding that California's
statutory rape law was not unconstitutionally discriminatory even though it
protected only underage women).
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rational basis review in cases like Department of Agriculture U.
Moreno,167 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,168 Plyler v.
Doe,169 Romer v. Evans,170 and Lawrence v. Texas.171 In each case,
ostensibly applying a rational basis standard, the Court invalidated
the challenged law. The application of the standard, moreover, bore
little resemblance to that in cases like Nordlinger v. Hahn: The
legitimacy of state aims was not presumed, and the Court refused to
hypothesize acceptable reasons that would support the
classifications or regulation. At the other end of the spectrum, strict
scrutiny is not necessarily "fatal in fact,"172 as Gunther once
described it.173 The Court in Grutter, for example, applied strict
scrutiny in a rather deferential manner to the Michigan law school's
admissions program.1 74
The emergence of sub rosa standards of review have garnered
criticism from commentators who argue such "subterfuge" makes the
Court seem unprincipled or dishonest.75 While we share some of the
frustrations that result from inconsistent doctrinal applications, we
think that viewing the Court's doctrine from a risk regulation
standpoint helps to explain such inconsistencies and thus, makes
them appear more justifiable. Even if it is decided that a particular
set of decision rules is generally suited for a set of cases, the risks
raised in individual members of that set might appear different in
light of concrete facts than they do in the abstract.
167. 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (invalidating legislation restricting eligibility for food
stamps to households comprised of related persons).
168. 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding unconstitutional requirement that group
homes for the mentally disabled, but not other group homes, had to obtain special
use permit).
169. 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking down Texas law prohibiting undocumented
children from enrolling in public school).
170. 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating Colorado constitutional amendment
withdrawing protected class status from gays and lesbians; concluding
unconstitutional "animus" motivated passage of amendment).
171. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
172. Gunther, supra note 123, at 8.
173. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 81, at 1267 (describing the variations of the
decision rules known collectively as "strict scrutiny"); see also Adam Winkler, Fatal
in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal
Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006).
174. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) (noting that "[c]ontext
matters when reviewing race-based governmental action under the Equal Protection
Clause" because "[n]ot every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable").
175. See, e.g., Massey, supra note 123; Kermit Roosevelt III, Constitutional
Calcification: How the Law Becomes What the Court Does, 91 VA. L. REV. 1649
(2005); Sherry, supra note 113.
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For example, it seems that the Moreno-Plyler-Cleburne-Romer
line of cases recognize that the usual rational basis default rule-
that political safeguards are sufficient to guard against
governmental overreaching-may not apply in cases involving
identifiable out groups whose members might not be able to activate
the normal safeguards that restrain simple majorities. With such out
groups, the risks that some unsavory motivation-call it "animus,"
prejudice, fear, or what have you-lies behind the classification or
legislation is higher than it is when the target is simply, say, recent
purchasers of real estate. 176 Moreover, these out groups may not
share the same opportunities for "voice" (i.e., sufficiently meaningful
participation in the political process) or "exit" (i.e., the ability freely
to accept or reject participation in a given organization, program, or
political jurisdiction) that are enjoyed by other groups, 177 suggesting
that they may not be able to adequately employ whatever safeguards
the political process normally offers. If one of the goals of doctrinal
risk regulation is optimal enforcement of constitutional principle
that strives toward a "mature position," then mindless application of
decision rules heedless of context would be a foolish consistency
indeed. At the very least, adopting a risk regulation model provides
a defense against charges that the Court's variations in its
application of decision rules is necessarily dishonest or unprincipled.
B. Agenda for Future Research
If the doctrine-as-risk-regulation model has some purchase, and
perhaps even some explanatory power, it raises a number of issues
that warrant study. These questions occur both. at the wholesale and
retail levels. Is there, for example, reason to believe that the Court
and its Justices can accurately assess risk, much less regulate it
with doctrine? Professor Nash has his doubts. "[C]ourts," he notes,
"generally lack sufficient information to conduct meaningful risk
analysis," and information is crucial because "[r]isk analysis draws
upon empirical evidence." 178 Even with access to empirical evidence,
there are reasons to wonder whether the right lessons will be drawn
176. Cf. Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST.
COMMENT. 257, 258 (1996) ("This principle, in a nutshell, forbids the government
from designating any societal group as untouchable, regardless of whether the group
in question is generally entitled to some special degree of judicial protection, like
blacks, or to no special protection, like left-handers (or, under current doctrine,
homosexuals).").
177. See Ilya Somin, Revitalizing Consent, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 753,
761-62 (2000) (distinguishing "voice" and "exit").
178. Nash, supra note 19, at 220.
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from it, or whether the evidence will be distorted because Justices no
less than the rest of us are subject to a host of cognitive biases that
can affect our perception of risk.179 If that is indeed the case, are
there ways to de-bias judicial thinking to leave the Justices less open
to cognitive error when considering whether (and, if so, to what
extent) risk exists to constitutional principle? 80
Moreover, if part of the Court's risk assessment includes ajudgment that particular political risks warrant judicial solutions,
what factors contribute to that judgment?' 8 ' In earlier work, we
have hypothesized that the decision whether or not the Court creates
an anti-evasion doctrine turns on evidence that political safeguards
are sufficiently robust to protect against constitutional
overreaching.1 8 2 If this is true for supplementary decision rules like
anti-evasion doctrines, might it also be true when decision rules are
initially created by the Court? In other words, the Court's choice of
one (more or less deferential) decision rule over another might be a
proxy for the Court's view of the adequacy of political safeguards.for
that particular constitutional principle.183
Even if one thinks the Court can use doctrine to perform this
risk regulation function, one might ask whether it has chosen the
appropriate vehicle in particular areas. As we have demonstrated, a
good deal of the Court's doctrine reflects precautionary concerns. But
Professor Vermeule notes that precautionary principles are
vulnerable to a number of objections. He identifies futility, jeopardy,
and perversity arguments, as well as arguments for ex post as
179. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011). For
evidence that judges are susceptible to cognitive biases described by Kahneman, see,
for example, Chris Guthrie, et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777
(2001) (conducting empirical study of federal magistrate judges and concluding that
judges are as susceptible as other decisionmakers to certain cognitive biases). See
also Alexander I. Platt, Debiasing Statutory Interpretation, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
275, 291-92 (2012) (discussing various studies that indicate judges are susceptible to
cognitive biases).
180. Cf. Paul M. Secunda, Cognitive Illiberalism and Institutional Debiasing
Strategies, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 373, 387-406 (2012) (discussing possible debiasing
mechanisms, ranging from opinion writing techniques to institutional reform, to
counter "culturally motivated cognition and the related phenomenon of cognitive
illiberalism in labor and employment law cases").
181. Cf. Denning & Kent, Anti-Anti-Evasion, supra note 12, at 415-31
(hypothesizing what makes the Court unwilling to create anti-evasion doctrines in
cases where it might have done so).
182. Id. at 422-31.
183. We are currently working on another paper taking this position. Brannon P.
Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., A Political Safeguards Theory of Decision Rules
(unpublished work-in-progress).
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opposed to ex ante remedies, as responses to calls for precautionary
principles.
"Futility arguments" are those in which "the opponent argues
that a given precautionary principle will fail to attain its ends."
18 4
"Jeopardy arguments" hold "that a given precaution will produce net
costs in light of countervailing risks on other margins." 185 That is,
"the opponent points to a distinct countervailing risk whose expected
costs will be increased by the precaution."1 86 On the other hand,
"perversity arguments" make the case that "a given precaution will
prove self-defeating because of countervailing risks on the same
margin-in other words, because it actually exacerbates the very
risk the precaution attempts to prevent."1 87 Finally, precautionary
principles may be met by the objection that stringent ex ante
remedies are unnecessary when ex post remedies can be "applied
case-by-case, after the relevant risk has actually materialized."1
88
184. VERMEULE, supra note 16, at 54.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 58 (footnote omitted).
187. Id. at 54.
188. Id. Vermeule offers several retail-level, doctrinal examples of each response
to arguments for precautionary principles. For example, critics can employ the
futility argument against precautionary principles in First Amendment
jurisprudence-whereby judges commit to providing strong free speech protections in
times of crisis-and claim that they "will systematically tend to prove futile when
they would prevent government from taking action against apparently dangerous
threats." Id. at 57. Precautionary free speech principles could also be described as
perverse because they may end up undermining the very idea of free speech "by
tolerating political speech and participation by groups who would repeal liberal
protections if they came to power." Id. at 69. For a thoughtful examination of this
problem in a comparative perspective, see Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies,
120 HARV. L. REV. 1405 (2007).
The rule of reasonable doubt is vulnerable to the jeopardy objection, argues
Vermeule, because focusing exclusively on false positives-onvictions of innocent
persons-"overlook[s] the countervailing risk of false negatives." VERMEULE, supra
note 16, at 61. Releasing guilty persons raises the risk they will commit future
crimes thus "depriv[ing] third-party innocents of their liberty," meaning that "the
liberty of innocents appears on both sides of the balance ..... Id. (footnotes omitted).
Lastly, the strict rule against state taxation of federal instrumentalities
was, at one point, expanded to include "private parties who do business with the
federal government," id. at 73, thus creating a powerful ex ante restraint on state
taxing power. As Vermeule explains, "the point of this doctrine was to create a
precautionary buffer to protect the freedom of otherwise valid federal operations." Id.
The Court later abandoned this strict approach, adopting instead Justice Holmes's
position that "ex post, case-by-case assessment of the destructive effect of state
taxation on federal contractors would be efiough to protect vital federal interests,
without overprotecting those interests to such a degree as to squash the legitimate
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Vermeule suggests that those proposing precautionary principles
as the proper vehicles for regulating political risk-a group that
surely includes many judges and scholars-focus unduly on "fat tail"
risks without recognizing that "[tihe very constitutional structures
that rulemakers set up to safeguard against remote but extremely
damaging possibilities may themselves create a remote chance of an
exceedingly harmful outcome."1 89 In extreme circumstances, judges
may "display a pathological fear of succumbing to pathological fear, a
kind of phobophobia" and "prove pathologically unwilling to bend or
break the rules . . . even when such exceptions are socially desirable,
all things considered." 190 That rigidity can, in turn, undermine the
principle they were seeking to protect in the long run.1s1
As a possible antidote to such overestimation or one-sided
calculation of risk, Vermeule recommends the mature position,
which seeks optimal (rather than maximal) protections.1 92 In a world
where there are more judicial Herberts than Herculeses,1 93 however,
one might question whether judges can ever rise above their own
cognitive limitations and accurately establish the mature position.
Such doubts may lead someone to recommend something like
Thayer's rule of clear mistake in most constitutional cases.1 94
Finally, if we're correct that the fundamental issue in decision
rule choice is whether or not to defer to other branches of
government based on the perceived risk to constitutional principle
presented by a particular case or set of cases, then how exactly do
the myriad verbal formulae employed by the Court reflect both its
perception of and response to risk? 9 5 Could these be scrapped in
favor of "generic constitutional law,"1 9 6 such as the proportionality
taxing power of the states." Id.; see, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720
(1982) (upholding nondiscriminatory state taxes on federal contractors).
189. Id. at 80.
190. Id. at 83.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 85 (arguing that "the mature position has an important negative
function . . . in the domain of constitutional design and interpretation: it places
tradeoffs on the 'viewscreen' and thereby excludes unconstrained demand for
'maximal safety' or 'security' against perceived risks") (footnotes omitted).
193. The reference is to Ronald Dworkin's "lawyer of superhuman skill, learning,
patience and acumen" as compared with the more pedestrian "Herbert." RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105, 125 (1977).
194. James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARv. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893) (articulating his rule of clear
mistake).
195. On the origins of judicial scrutiny, see G. Edward White, Historicizing
Judicial Scrutiny, 57 S.C. L. REV. 1 (2005).
196. David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652 (2005).
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principle employed by constitutional courts around the world?197 Or
do the choice of words and phrases have some independent value
that corresponds to differing levels of risk as perceived by the Court,
as we suggest above? Might a focus on the particular risks
themselves (as opposed to the verbal formulations of the standards
of review) clarify what risks the Court is seeking to regulate and
enable it to better fit standards to risks, rather than the other way
around?
IV. CONCLUSION
Decision rules created by courts to implement constitutional
principles-what we have called "judicial doctrine"-can be
understood as an example of second-order political risk regulation.
Regarding the creation and application of judicial doctrine as a form
of risk regulation has considerable payoff for the study of
constitutional law. First, it contributes to the understanding of
doctrine as a fluid, not static, body of law. Second, it provides a
metric by which the success or failure of doctrine can be measured.
Adopting the risk regulation model also provides some explanation
for aspects of constitutional law that bedevil observers: the tendency
of the Court to shift its agenda over time; the variety and complexity
of constitutional doctrine generally; and the Court's occasional
inconsistency in the application of its decision rules. At the same
time, the risk regulation model of doctrine raises questions,
specifically about the capacity of Justices accurately to assess risk
and develop decision rules that provide optimal, as opposed to
maximal or minimal protection, for constitutional principle
generally, as well as in specific areas of constitutional law.
197. See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Matthews, Proportionality Balancing and
Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 72 (2008).
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